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LIMITING LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 1983: THE
NARROWING OF CONSTITUTIONAL "LIBERTY"
INTRODUCTION
In two recent decisions, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit limited governmental exposure to liability under section
19831 at the expense of individuals' constitutionally protected "liberty"
interests. 2 In Melton v. City of Oklahoma City,3 the court narrowed the
circumstances under which a public employee can sustain a section 1983
action for the deprivation of a liberty interest in an untarnished reputa-
tion. In Hilliard v. City and County of Denver,4 the court indicated that an
individual's liberty interest in personal security against bodily harm is
not redressed under section 1983 unless the state has physical control
over the person. Section one of this Survey discusses the history of the
liberty interest in personal security and in public employment.5 Section
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities se-
cured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Courts have limited the scope of state liability under § 1983 by describing the Consti-
tution as a "charter of negative liberties" which restrains state officials from interfering
with a person's protected interests. Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982).
Only in certain limited circumstances, the Court has concluded, does the Constitution im-
pose affirmative duties of care and protection on state actors. See Youngberg v. Romeo,
457 U.S. 307 (1982) (the substantive component of due process requires the state to pro-
vide involuntarily committed mental patients with services necessary to ensure their "rea-
sonable safety"); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (the Eighth Amendment
requires the state to provide adequate medical care to prisoners). Additionally, in some
cases the state is immune from § 1983 liability notwithstanding its violation of a citizen's
rights. For instance, the principle of qualified immunity provides that government officials
performing discretionary functions are not liable for their conduct unless their actions
violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
Also, the Court has held that "merely negligent" actions by the state are not sufficient
to state a claim under § 1983. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 333 (1986) (the Court
expressly left open the question of whether recklessness or gross negligence was enough
to trigger due process protection). Finally, § 1983 is unavailable where the state provided
an adequate post-deprivation remedy. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
2. Another significant decision by the Tenth Circuit in 1991, which will not be dis-
cussed in this Survey, is Trujillo v. Grand Junction Regional Center, 928 F.2d 973 (10th
Cir. 1991). The court held in Trujillo that the discriminatory discharge of an employee was
not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Section 1981 grants "[aill persons ... the same
right ... to make and enforce contracts." The Tenth Circuit subsequently applied this
holding in Carter v. Sedgwick County, 929 F.2d 1501 (10th Cir. 1991) and Padilla v.
United Airlines, Inc., 950 F.2d 654 (10th Cir. 1991). Trujillo was overruled, however, by
The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3, 105 Star. 1071 (1991). The 1991
Act specifically amended 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to include protection against discriminatory
termination of an employment contract. Id. § 101, 105 Stat. at 1071-72. See Patrick v.
Miller, 953 F.2d 1240 (10th Cir. 1992).
3. 928 F.2d 920 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 296 (1991).
4. 930 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 656 (1991).
5. See discussion infra section I.
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two examines the Tenth Circuit's decisions in Melton and Hilliard.6 Sec-
tion three argues the Melton and Hilliard decisions narrowly construe lib-
erty interests in section 1983 actions and are, in effect, a ruse for simply
limiting state liability.
7
I. THE LIBERTY INTEREST IN PERSONAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC
EMPLOYMENT
Liberty interests derive from the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, 8 made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. 9 Due process has two fundamental components: proce-
dural and substantive. The procedural aspect, addressed by the Tenth
Circuit in Melton, guarantees a fair decision-making process before gov-
ernmental action impairs a person's constitutional rights.1 0 Substantive
due process, interpreted by the Tenth Circuit in Hilliard, is concerned
with the constitutionality of a rule or governmental action.11
In 1897, the Supreme Court explicitly repudiated the long standing
proposition that due process liberty included "only the right of a citizen
to be free from physical restraint."' 2 Twenty six years later, in Meyer v.
Nebraska,1 3 the Court recognized that liberty preserved by the Constitu-
tion, "denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the
right... generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common
law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." 14
Although the Court continues to acknowledge its broad interpretation
in Meyer, during the last three decades it has restricted the liberty protec-
tion of the Due Process Clause in the areas of public employment and
personal security. 15
A. Public Employment
Since the 1960's, the Court has recognized that the government,
acting in its role as employer, is subject to the limitations imposed by the
6. See discussion infra section II.
7. See discussion infra section III.
8. "No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law .... U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 1.
9. "No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law .... " U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
10. JOHN E. NOWAK, RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONsTrrTUnONAL LAW, § 10.6 (4th ed.
1991).
11. Id.
12. Henry P. Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property, "62 CORNELL L. REV. 405, 413-14
(1977) (quoting Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897)).
13. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
14. Id. at 399. In a later decision, the Court stated: "[Tihe liberty safeguarded (by
due process) is liberty in a social organization which requires the protection of law against
the evils which menace the.., safety... and welfare of the people." West Coast Hotel Co.
v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937).
15. See Monaghan, supra note 12, at 420; Aviam Soifer, Moral Ambition, Formalism, and
the "'Free World" of DeShaney, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1513, 1529 (1989); Randolph J.




Constitution -when dealing with its employees.16 Consequently, the
Court aggressively applied conventional constitutional analysis to pro-
tect the rights of individual employees. 17 More recently, however, the
Court's opinions have favored deference to public employers, emphasiz-
ing the need to provide governmental services efficiently.' 8 At the core
of the Court's rationale is the notion that the state must be free to make
day-to-day decisions without interference from individual claims of dep-
rivation of constitutional rights. 19 To implement its "deference policy"
the Court has narrowly construed the liberty interests protected by the
Due Process Clause.
20
Among the broad historical interests protected by the Court are
people's interests in their reputation. More specifically, in the context of
public employment, the Court has invoked the procedural safeguards of
due process to protect an employee's liberty interest in an untarnished
reputation. In Board of Regents v. Roth,2' the Court first explicitly recog-
nized the right of a public employee to a name-clearing hearing to rebut
government allegations implicating the reputation interests. 22 Liberty
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court acknowledged, in-
cluded the right "to enjoy those privileges . . . essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men."' 23 But the Court found "the range of
interests protected by due process is not infinite." 24 In Roth, the Court
identified two standards for evaluating due process claims that the gov-
ernment violated an employee's liberty interest in an untarnished repu-
tation. First, the government's statements must have stigmatized the
employee and damaged his standing in the community.25 Second, the
allegation must have foreclosed the person's freedom to take advantage
of other employment opportunities.
26
During the late 1970s, further requirements were added to the Roth
standards in Paul v. Davis2 7 and Codd v. Velger.28 First, the Court found
stigmatizing an employee's reputation, alone, was not sufficient to in-
voke procedural due process protection.29 In addition to stigmatization,
there must be a causal connection with termination of employment.30
16. Developments in the Law: Public Employment, 97 HAIv. L. REv. 1611, 1739 (1984)
[hereinafter Developments].
17. Id.; see, e.g., Keyishan v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (government em-
ployment conditions could not include unreasonable restrictions on First Amendment ex-
pression); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (state could not terminate employment
based on public employee's religious beliefs).
18. Developments, supra note 16, at 1739.
19. Monaghan, supra note 12, at 420-21.
20. See id.; see also Haines, supra note 15, at 191.
21. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
22. Id. at 569-70.
23. Id. at 572 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
24. Id. at 570.
25. Id. at 573.
26. Id.
27. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
28. 429 U.S. 624 (1977).
29. Paul, 424 U.S. at 701.
30. Id.
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Also, the stigmatizing statement must have been publicized 3 l and the
employee had to allege it was false.3 2 Finally, the public employer was
required to "create and disseminate" the false and defamatory impres-
sion about the employee in connection with his termination.3 3 If these
requirements were met, due process mandated that the government
provide the employee with a hearing to rebut the allegations.
3 4
In 1980, however, the Court retreated from its restrictive interpre-
tation of reputation interests in the context of public employment. In
Owen v. City of Independence,3 5 the City Council publicized an investigative
report alleging Chief of Police Owen took part in corrupt and criminal
activities.3 6 Although the investigation found no criminal activity, Owen
was discharged by the city manager who gave no reasons for the dismis-
sal. 37 The local press gave prominent coverage to a report released by
the City Council and linked Owen's dismissal to the investigation.
3 8
The Owen majority opinion was written by Justice Brennan, a dis-
senter to the Court's previous decisions curtailing public employees'
reputation interests.3 9 In Owen, Justice Brennan relied on the finding of
the federal court of appeals that whether stigmatizing charges came
from the government was immaterial.40 Of greater importance, accord-
ing to the lower court and Justice Brennan, was that the public believed
Owen was dismissed for perjury.4 1 In dissent, Justice Powell pointed
out the Owen decision was contrary to precedent. The government must
"create and disseminate" a false impression about the employee in or-
der to violate an employee's liberty interest. 42 Justice Powell concluded
the majority's reliance on "public misapprehension" as a due process
violation was irrelevant.
43
31. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348 (1976).
32. Codd, 429 U.S. at 627.
33. Id. at 628.
34. Id. at 627-28.
35. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
36. Id. at 627-628.
37. Id. at 629.
38. Id.
39. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). Paul held that stigmatization, alone, did
not trigger due process protection. Id. at 701. Brennan found the Court's decision
"wholly excludes personal interest in reputation from the ambit of 'life, liberty or prop-
erty.' " Id. at 721 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He concluded with the statement: "Today's
decision must surely be a short-lived aberration." Id. at 735. In Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S.
341 (1976), Brennan found the Court's requirement that the stigmatizing statements were
publicized by the government "simply another [unwarranted] curtailment of precious con-
stitutional safeguards." Id. at 352-53 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Finally, in Codd v. Velger,
429 U.S. 624 (1977), Brennan adopted the reasoning of Justice Stevens. Id. at 629 (Bren-
nan,J., dissenting). Stevens did not agree with the majority that a person claiming to have
been stigmatized without being afforded due process was required to allege that the
charge against him was false. Id. at 635 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
40. Owen, 445 U.S. at 631.
41. Id. at 631-32.
42. Id. at 661-64 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing Codd, 429 U.S. at 628).




The Supreme Court has long recognized a liberty interest in per-
sonal security in cases involving the Fourth Amendment right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures. 4 4 More recently, the Court
found the same liberty interest implicated in the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.4 5 In Ingraham v.
Wright,4 6 the Court concluded public school students' liberty interest in
personal security, derived from the substantive component of the Due
Process Clause, protected them from punishment that included inflic-
tion of physical pain.
4 7
Recognizing the primary purpose of due process was to prevent the
government from infringing on the rights of individuals, the Court in
Youngberg v. Romeo4 8 found, as a general rule, "a State is under no con-
stitutional duty to provide substantive services [to its citizens]."
4 9 It
held, however, the Due Process Clause required the state to provide in-
voluntarily committed mental patients with services necessary to ensure
their "reasonable safety." 50 Alternatively, courts have recognized that
the government has a constitutional duty to provide for a citizen where a
"special relationship" existed between the state and a particular individ-
ual.5 ' Finally, substantive due process has protected individuals from
conduct by governmental officials that was fundamentally offensive to a
sense ofjustice.
52
II. TENTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS
A. Melton v. City of Oklahoma City 5
3
1. Facts
Raymond Melton was a lieutenant in the Oklahoma City Police De-
44. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
45. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
46. 430 U.S. 651 (1976).
47. Id. at 673-74. The Court in Ingraham determined the right to be free from unjusti-
fied intrusions on personal security was among the historic liberties granted at common
law and therefore was included in the definition of "liberty" set forth in Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). The Court, however, decided the case based on the
plaintiff's procedural due process claim. It held the state post-deprivation tort remedies
satisfied due process. Id.
48. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
49. Id. at 317.
50. Id. at 319.
51. See Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.) ("If the state
puts a man in a position of danger from private persons and then fails to protect him.., it
is as much an active tortfeasor as if it had thrown him into a snake pit."); see alsoJensen v.
Conrad, 747 F.2d 185, 193-94 (4th Cir. 1984) (custodial or other relationships created or
assumed by states in respect of particular persons may give rise to a state duty to protect
those individuals), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985). But see DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1990) (limiting "special relationships" to
situations involving state imposed "custody"). For a discussion of DeShaney see infra notes
160-66 and accompanying text.
52. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952).
53. Melton v. City of Oklahoma City, 928 F.2d 920 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
296 (1991).
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partment and friend of William Page, a judge indicted on felony
charges. Melton surreptitiously recorded his conversation with a federal
prosecutor during an interview in connection with Page's trial and
turned the tape over to defense counsel. 54 Following the trial, the F.B.I.
accused Melton of improperly disclosing the details of his conversation
with the prosecutor and of perjuring himself in an affidavit and during
trial.5 5 An investigation revealed the perjury charge was unfounded.
However, pursuant to police department policy, the filed report reached
no conclusions. 56 Prior to a police department disciplinary board hear-
ing, a local newspaper reported that Melton was under investigation for
committing perjury during Page's trial. The information was attributed
to "informed sources" and to Lieutenant McBride, the police depart-
ment's public information officer.57 McBride's quoted statements in-
cluded confirmation that Melton was under investigation for perjury
charges and that "[the] investigation did not establish whether Melton
perjured himself."5 8
The police disciplinary board did not consider the perjury charge,
but found Melton's recording of the conversation with the federal prose-
cutor warranted dismissal from the force.5 9 In response to media in-
quiry, McBride confirmed that Melton was discharged for violating the
department's code of ethics. 60 No media report carried information that
Melton was cleared of the perjury charge. McBride testified, however,
that he told several radio stations the perjury charge was unfounded.
6 1
Melton filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming the published
quotes of Lieutenant McBride, which revealed the F.B.I. perjury accusa-
tions, tarnished his reputation. 6 2 The procedural component of the Due
Process Clause, he argued, required the government to afford him an
opportunity to rebut the allegations reported to the media.63 A jury
found that Melton was deprived of his liberty interest when he was dis-
charged from the police department. To prevail on his liberty interest
claim, the jury was instructed that Melton must have proven his termina-
tion was accompanied by public dissemination of the charges against
him and that the reasons for dismissal stigmatized his reputation or fore-
closed him from future employment opportunities. 64
54. Id. at 922.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 924. It was the duty of the reporting officer only to state facts in the report





61. Id. at 925.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 926 (emphasis in original).
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2. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
a. Majority Opinion
After reversing a portion of the district court's judgment,65 the
Tenth Circuit granted rehearing en banc to resolve issues relating to
Melton's liberty interest claim.6 6 The majority opinion was delivered by
Circuit Judge Moore. 67 The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court as
to the parameters of a liberty interest claim involving discharge of a pub-
lic employee. It determined the lower court erred because a public em-
ployee was entitled to a name-clearing hearing only if he proved
stigmatization and that he was an unlikely candidate for future employ-
ment.68 The court found "stigmatization" required proof of five fac-
tors: first, the public employer was the source of the derogatory
statements; 6 9 second, the employer took affirmative action against the
employee as part of a punitive proceeding; 70 third, the government's
accusations were publicized;7 1 fourth, the statements constituted a false
charge of dishonesty or immorality7 2 and finally, the allegations dam-
aged the employee's standing or associations in the community.
73
The Tenth Circuit concluded Lieutenant McBride's statements to
the Oklahoma City Times failed to qualify as "stigmatizing." 74 McBride
was not the sole source of the charges, nor was he responsible for their
publication.7 5 Also, the statements made by the police department were
true-Melton was accused of perjury by the F.B.I.76 Although the court
found truth was not a complete defense to every liberty interest claim of
this nature, it concluded that this case warranted exoneration of the po-
lice department.
77
Finally, the court found that since the police department never
"charged" Melton with perjury, he was not entitled to a name-clearing
hearing.78 In order to constitute a charge, "a stigmatizing statement
65. Melton v. City of Oklahoma City, 879 F.2d 706 (10th Cir. 1989), reh'ggranted, 928
F.2d 920 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 296 (1991).
66. Melton v. City of Oklahoma City, 928 F.2d 920 (10th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 296 (1991).
67. Id. at 922. ChiefJudge Holloway heard oral arguments but did not participate in
the decision of the court.
68. See id. 927 (emphasis added). The court found an employee is not required to
prove actual denial ofajob opportunity but emphasized the rule must be read as conjunc-
tive. Id
69. See id. at 926 (citing Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624 (1977)).
70. Id. (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976)).
71. Id. (citing Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976)).
72. Id. (citing Codd, 429 U.S. at 627) (emphasis added)).
73. Id. at 927 (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972)).
74. Id. at 929-930.
75. Id. at 928 n.12. The court relied on Codd, 429 U.S. at 628, in which the Supreme
Court stated the employer must "create and disseminate" the false statement or impres-
sion in order to stigmatize an employee.
76. Mellon, 928 F.2d at 928 (emphasis in original).
77. Id. at 929 (citing Codd, 429 U.S. at 628). The court stated that past decisions indi-
cated falsity was an element of a public employee's liberty claim. Id. at 929 n.14 (citing
Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220, 1227 (10th Cir. 1984); Asbill v. Housing
Auth. of Choctaw Nation, 726 F.2d 1499, 1501 (10th Cir. 1984)).
78. Id. at 930.
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must be the basis of punitive action taken by a public entity against one
of its employees."' 79 Stigmatization without punitive action, the court
found, did not violate a protected liberty interest.80 Denying Melton's
claim, the court concluded the perjury charges were not part of the dis-
ciplinary measure taken against Melton. Furthermore, the police de-
partment did not take affirmative action against Melton. Mere reporting
of third party defamatory accusations, the majority held, did not make
the government liable for the deprivation of a liberty interest.8 1 The
court recognized, however, that Melton's liberty would be deprived if
the police department manifestly adopted the accusations as the basis
for his discharge.8 2 Nevertheless, it found the evidence completely con-




Circuit Judge Logan dissented, joined by Circuit Judges McKay and
Seymour.8 4 The dissent agreed with the majority that a public employee
must prove both stigmatization and foreclosure of future employment to
warrant due process protection.8 5 The dissent concluded, however, that
Melton satisfied the inference of stigmatization with evidence of the me-
dia reports surrounding his dismissal from the police department.
8 6
Contrary to the majority view, the source of the defamatory statements
should be irrelevant. 8 7 Additionally, the truthfulness of the charges
should not matter-a public employee need only allege the accusations
were false.8 8 Also, the dissent disagreed with the majority's finding that
the government must take affirmative action against an employee. The
dissent argued due process was violated since the government contrib-
uted to public awareness of the charges and then failed to take sufficient
action to dispel the stigma.8 9 Lastly, the dissent found the police de-
partment stigmatized Melton by impliedly adopting the media reports
that he was discharged for perjury. 90
79. Id. The court emphasized the government must take affirmative action against the
employee to trigger due process protection.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 931.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 932 (Logan, J., dissenting).
85. Id. (emphasis in original).
86. Id. at 934, 937.
87. Id.
88. Id. (emphasis added).
89. Id. at 937.
90. Id. at 936.
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B. Hilliard v. City and County of Denver9 '
1. Facts
Kathy Hilliard was a passenger in an automobile involved in a minor
accident. The operator of the vehicle was arrested for driving under the
influence of alcohol and removed from the scene. The arresting of-
ficers, after determining Hilliard was too intoxicated to drive, im-
pounded the vehicle leaving her in a high crime area.9 2 After an
unsuccessful attempt to phone for assistance, she returned to the vehicle
where she was robbed and sexually assaulted. 93 Hilliard was found the
next morning stripped naked, bleeding, and barely conscious. 9 4 She
brought suit under section 1983 claiming the police officers' failure to
take her into protective custody pursuant to the state emergency com-
mitment statute9 5 violated her constitutional right to life, liberty, travel
and personal integrity. 9 6
The district court dismissed Hilliard's allegations of general consti-
tutional deprivation under section 1983.97 The court did not dismiss
her claim that the officers' reckless disregard for the state emergency
commitment statute violated her Fourteenth Amendment liberty inter-
est in personal security.9 8 The district court denied the government's
motion for summary judgement on qualified immunity grounds, con-
cluding the officers' actions violated "clearly established" constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.9 9
2. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
Circuit Judges Tacha and Ebel, and District Judge Johnson, sitting
by designation, reversed the lower court and ordered dismissal of Hil-
liard's complaint. 0 0 Judge Tacha delivered the opinion of the court
concluding the officers were entitled to qualified immunity since their
actions did not violate a "clearly established" constitutional right.' 0 '
The court also stated "[w]hether such a liberty interest [in personal se-
curity] exists under the facts of this case is an issue we do not reach."'
0 2
Despite its disclaimer, dicta of the court indicates it did not believe
Hilliard was deprived of a constitutional right.10 3 The decision recog-
nized the existence of a liberty interest in personal security in cases in-
91. Hilliard v. City and County of Denver, 930 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 656 (1991).
92. Id. at 1517.
93. Id. at 1517-18.
94. Id. at 1518.
95. COLO. REv. STAT. § 25-1-310 (1989).
96. Hilliard, 930 F.2d at 1518.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1518-19.
99. Id. at 1518.
100. Id. at 1521.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1519.
103. Id. at 1521.
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volving the Fourth and Eighth Amendments.' 0 4 The court also
acknowledged the Supreme Court's holding in Ingraham v. Wright 105
that the substantive component of the Due Process Clause is the source
of a liberty interest in personal security.' 0 6 The Hilliard court con-
cluded, however, "[tihe existence of a constitutional right to personal
security as recognized in Ingraham may well depend on [the] element of
legitimate state power over the person of the plaintiff."'1 7 Distinguish-
ing the facts in Hilliard, the Tenth Circuit found the public school stu-
dents in Ingraham were in an environment where the state had lawful
control over their liberty.1 0 8 Their situation, the court stated, could be
analogized to that of arrestees, convicts, and patients involuntarily com-
mitted to state mental hospitals, whose liberty interests in personal se-
curity were protected by the Fourth and Eighth Amendments. 10 9 No
such lawful control over the personal security of Hilliard was found. Fi-
nally, the court was not persuaded by decisions of the Seventh and Ninth
Circuits, which treated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause as the source of a right to personal security in instances where
the state had no physical control over the plaintiff. 11
III. ANALYSIS: LIMITING STATE LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 1983 AT
THE EXPENSE OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY
The Tenth Circuit's decisions in Melton v. City of Oklahoma City 1"
and Hilliard v. City and County of Denver" 2 effectively limit the scope of
section 1983 under the guise of a restrictive interpretation of the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause. Failing to recognize that "[i]n a
Constitution for a free people.., the meaning of liberty must be broad
indeed,"" 13 the court in both cases narrowed the circumstances in which
the government is liable under section 1983 at the expense of individu-
als' liberty.
In Melton, the court narrowly interpreted the liberty in the Four-
teenth Amendment by severely limiting the circumstances under which
procedural due process protects a public employee's reputation. Such a
result, the court leads us to believe, is mandated by precedent and nec-
104. Id. at 1519.
105. 430 U.S. 651 (1976).
106. Hilliard, 930 F.2d at 1519-20 (citing Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 672-73).
107. Id. at 1520.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1519-20. The Tenth Circuit cited Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630
(1886) (Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures) and
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1982). Youngberg is probably an erroneous
reference, however, since the case was fundamentally concerned with the Fourteenth
Amendment, not the Eighth Amendment, as the source of a liberty interest in personal
security. Following the lead of DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 489
U.S. 189, 198-99 (1988), the appropriate cite should be Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97
(1976).
110. Hilliard, 930 F.2d at 1520; see infra notes 143-59 and accompanying text.
111. 928 F.2d 920 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 296 (1991).
112. 930 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 656 (1991).
113. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972).
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essary to afford the state flexibility required to function as an efficient
employer. This balancing approach unjustly leaves individual liberty
subordinate to efficiency. The court thinks we cannot see its true mo-
tive-limit state liability under section 1983.
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Melton reflects an unnecessarily nar-
row interpretation of the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.1 14  Its stigmatization requirements 1 5  severely limit the
circumstances under which due process liberty ensures a public em-
ployee's untarnished reputation. The circuit court's standards consti-
tute a misinterpretation of the Supreme Court decision in Board of
Regents v. Roth 116 and its progeny, 1 7 including a failure to recognize the
Court's decision in Owen v. City of Independence.1 18 Furthermore, the
Tenth Circuit departs from its previous rationale in devising the "stig-
matization test." Its disregard of indications that Melton was stigma-
tized by the police department reveals its underlying goal of limiting
state liability under section 1983.
The court cited three reasons for denying Melton's stigmatization
claim, each of which is unwarranted. First, the court rejected Melton's
liberty interest claim because statements by the Oklahoma City Police
Department were found truthful. However, as the dissent in Melton indi-
cated, the Supreme Court's holding in Codd v. Velger"' 9 requires only
that a plaintiff allege falsity of the stigmatizing charge, which Melton did
in the instant case. 120 This sentiment is mirrored in the Supreme
Court's decision in Owen. The Court found a liberty interest implicated
where the government, "released to the public an allegedly false state-
ment."' 2 1 More importantly, however, Melton is particularly difficult to
reconcile in light of the Tenth Circuit's decision in McGhee v. Draper (Mc-
Ghee I1).122 In that case the court was presented with the question of
whether a public school teacher was stigmatized when she was dismissed
amid publicity alleging immoral conduct. In determining the teacher
was stigmatized, the court stated: "The truth or falsity of any charges
made.., is not relevant to determining the existence of a due process
violation."'123 The Tenth Circuit required only that the employee chal-
114. Cf. Monaghan, supra note 12, at 420-23 (explosion of procedural due process liti-
gation encourages a judicial effort to limit the conception of "liberty" under due process
clause).
115. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
116. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
117. See supra notes 21-43 and accompanying text.
118. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
119. 429 U.S. 624 (1977).
120. Melton, 928 F.2d at 937 (Logan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); see Developments,
supra note 16, at 1790.
121. Owen, 445 U.S. at 633 n.13 (emphasis added); see Codd, 429 U.S. at 634 (Stevens,J.,
dissenting). Note that Justice Brennan, author of Owen, apparently agreed with Stevens
that a person need not allege the falsity of a stigmatizing charge. See Owen, 445 U.S. at 633
n.13.
122. 639 F.2d 639, 643 (10th Cir. 1981). The court in McGhee II also stated that Codd
read in context meant only that, absent a challenge to the truthfulness of the charges, no
hearing is necessary. Id. at 643 n.3 (citing Codd, 429 U.S. at 628).
123. Id. at 643.
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lenge the veracity of the charge. 12 4 Thus, the principal requirement in
Codd is not the truthfulness of the charges, rather whether the victim has
alleged that the statements were false. Lastly, the Melton court found Codd
supported a decision that the truthfulness of the police department's
statements warranted exoneration of the department since damage to
Melton's reputation was not intended.' 25 The Tenth Circuit's inquiry
into the police department's intent for reporting the statements, how-
ever, is unfounded. The Supreme Court's analysis in Codd makes no ref-
erence to a public employer's intentions-they are not a relevant factor
in considering whether an employee was stigmatized. 12 6
Second, the Tenth Circuit concluded, since the Oklahoma City Po-
lice Department was not the source of the charges, the department did
not stigmatize Melton. 127 This requirement is again unsubstantiated.
The Supreme Court in Owen determined that the source of the allega-
tions was irrelevant. 12 8 The most important factor, the Court found,
was what the public perceived to be the reason for dismissal. 12 9 Even
past decisions of the Tenth Circuit have not required that the govern-
ment be the source of stigmatizing charges.13 0 For example, in Eames v.
City of Logan,13 ' the director of parks alleged he was stigmatized by pub-
licity and rumors of criminal misconduct surrounding his termina-
tion.' 3 2 The Tenth Circuit held the circumstances were sufficient to
implicate Eames's liberty interest in a good reputation.' 3 3 Similarly, in
McGhee v. Draper (McGhee 1),134 a public school teacher claimed she was
stigmatized by rumors and gossip in the community when her contract
was not renewed.' 3 5 The court held that McGhee's allegations were ad-
equate evidence of infringement of her liberty interest to withstand a
directed verdict.'
3 6
The Melton court's final inconsistency is the finding that the liberty
interest claim was insufficient since the police department did not take
124. Id. at 643 n.3. The majority in Melton failed to recognize McGhee II, relying instead
on Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220 (10th Cir. 1984) and Asbill v. Housing
Auth. of the Choctaw Nation, 726 F.2d 1499 (10th Cir. 1984). These decisions, however,
offer weak support for the court's "actual falsity" requirement since the employees in both
cases failed to allege the public employer's charges were false.
125. Mellon, 928 F.2d at 929.
126. Codd, 429 U.S. 624.
127. Melton, 928 F.2d at 928 & n.12.
128. Owen, 445 U.S. at 631.
129. Id.; cf. Haines, supra note 12, at 224 n.187 (a stigma must be obvious to the public
and constitute a special discrepancy between virtual and actual social identity). Similarly,
the Third, First and Fourth Circuits focus on whether the employer's actions create a stig-
matizing impression. See Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5 v. Tucker, 868 F.2d 74 (3d
Cir. 1989); Rodriguez de Quinonez v. Perez, 596 F.2d 486 (1st Cir.) cert. denied, 444 U.S.
840 (1979); Cox v. Northern Va. Transp. Comm'n, 551 F.2d 555 (4th Cir. 1976).
130. See Melton, 928 F.2d at 935-36 (Logan, J., dissenting) (citing cases).
131. 762 F.2d 83 (10th Cir. 1985).
132. Id. at 84.
133. Id.
134. 564 F.2d 902 (10th Cir. 1977).
135. Id. at 904.
136. Id. at 910.
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action against Melton. 137 In the past, the Tenth Circuit has found that
government inaction may constitute stigmatization. In Eames the city
park service failed to dispel public sentiment that an employee's dis-
charge was related to stigmatizing rumors and accusations. The court
held procedural due process was violated since the city denied the em-
ployee a name-clearing hearing to rebut the allegations. 13 8 Similarly,
the court held in McGhee I the government could violate an employee's
liberty interest by impliedly adopting defamatory accusations asserted
against the employee.'
3 9
Circumstances in Melton are analogous to those in Eames since the
police department failed to dispel a false perception that Officer Melton
had been discharged for perjury. His fellow police officers believed the
perjury charges were the basis for Melton's dismissal. The Tenth Cir-
cuit's conclusion that the police department did not impliedly adopt the
published charges that Melton was dismissed for perjury is also tenuous
since the law enforcement community did in fact make the connec-
tion.14° In either case, the government's inaction adversely affected
Melton's reputation in the community, a protected liberty interest.
After a dose look at the case law, the Tenth Circuit's decision in
Mellon is not compelled by precedent. The court in Melton misinter-
preted the Supreme Court's decision in Owen and failed to apply past
Tenth Circuit decisions. Were these decisions properly applied in Mel-
ton, the public's perception that Officer Melton was dismissed for per-
jury would provide a reasonable basis for concluding he was stigmatized
by the government. As the dissent pointed out, the law enforcement
community believed Melton was discharged for perjury. 14 1 No great
leap of faith is required to conclude the public shared in this perception.
The Mellon "stigmatization test" circumscribes the instances in which a
public employee's liberty interest in a good reputation is protected. Its
practical effect was to fulfill the court's apparent goal of limiting the po-
tential claims against the state under section 1983.
The Tenth Circuit's underlying intent to limit the scope of section
1983 is even more apparent in Hilliard v. City and County of Denver.
14 2
The court resolved Hilliard by invoking qualified immunity to shield the
city from section 1983 liability for the conduct of its police officers, who
left Kathy Hilliard stranded and alone in a high-crime area. More signif-
icantly, the Tenth Circuit based its rejection of a liberty interest viola-
tion on the rationale that the state did not have physical control over
her. For the Tenth Circuit to hinge the existence of a liberty interest in
personal security on a threshold determination of whether the state has
137. Melton, 928 F.2d at 930.
138. Eames, 762 F.2d at 84.
139. McGhee I, 564 F.2d 902.
140. Melton, 928 F.2d at 935 (Logan, J., dissenting).
141. Id. During Melton's trial, there was testimony by a police officer that the law en-
forcement community believed Melton was discharged for perjury. Id.
142. 930 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 656 (1991).
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physical control over a person is unwarranted. Two factors support this
conclusion.
First, decisions by other appellate courts recognize an individual's
liberty interest in personal security in circumstances in which the state
has no physical control over the person. The Seventh Circuit in White v.
Rochford 143 and the Ninth Circuit in Wood v. Ostrander 144 found that a
liberty interest in personal security was violated in circumstances analo-
gous to those in Hiliard.1 4 5 These decisions undoubtedly support the
conclusion that physical control is not a condition precedent to the
existence of an individual's due process right to be free from unjustified
infliction of bodily harm by state actors.
In White, police officers arrested the driver of an automobile on the
Chicago Skyway, impounded his vehicle and left three minor children
stranded at the scene. 14 6 The children, exposed to the cold, left the car
and crossed eight lanes of traffic to telephone for help. They were finally
retrieved by a neighbor but as a result of the incident one child was
hospitalized for a week and all three suffered mental pain and
anguish. 147 The Seventh Circuit found that due process afforded a right
to some degree of bodily integrity and protected the children from un-
justified intrusions on bodily security.' 48 The right to personal security,
the court stated, included freedom from "unnecessary and unjustifiable
exposure to physical danger or injury to health."' 149 Additionally, the
court found due process restrained the government from activities
which were "fundamentally offensive to 'a sense of justice.' "150 The
Seventh Circuit concluded that abandoning children on a high-speed ex-
pressway on a cold evening was a clear violation of their liberty interest
in bodily integrity. 1 1
Following the rationale of White, the Ninth Circuit's Wood decision
recognized a liberty interest in personal security when presented with
facts again strikingly similar to those in Hilliard.'5 2 Wood was a passen-
ger in an automobile stopped by State Trooper Ostrander. After plac-
ing the driver under arrest and removing him from the scene, Ostrander
impounded the car and ordered Wood to leave the vehicle. Left
stranded in a high-crime area at 2:00 a.m., Wood accepted a ride with an
unknown man who raped her. The court found Wood protected by the
substantive component of the Due Process Clause.' 5 3 First, the court
concluded the officer acted "in callous disregard for Wood's personal
143. 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979).
144. 851 F.2d 1212 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 11 S. Ct. 341 (1990).
145. Hilliard, 930 F.2d at 1520-21.
146. White, 592 F.2d at 382.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 383 (quoting in part Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1976)).
149. Id. at 387 (Tone, J., concurring).
150. Id. at 383 (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952)).
151. Id. at 384. The Seventh Circuit reaffirmed White in Ellsworth v. City of Racine,
774 F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1047 (1986).
152. Wood, 851 F.2d at 1213.
153. Id. at 1213, 1216.
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security, a liberty interest." i 4 The court also adopted the interpreta-
tion of section 1983 found in White and imposed liability where innocent
parties were unnecessarily endangered in "reckless disregard of their
safety."'
155
The courts' rulings in White and Wood stand for the proposition that
physical control by the state is unnecessary to invoke due process pro-
tection. These decisions are persuasive toward finding a violation of
Hilliard's liberty interest in personal security. Leaving Kathy Hilliard
stranded and alone in a high-crime area constitutes "unjustifiable expo-
sure to physical danger,"' 56 and callous disregard for her personal se-
curity. 15 7 In Hilliard, the Tenth Circuit's statement that it was,
"appalled by the conduct of the [officers],"' 5 8 indicates that the state's
actions were fundamentally offensive to a sense of justice. 15 9 Indeed,
rejection of the dear parallels with White and Wood exposes the Tenth
Circuit's plan to limit state liability by narrowly interpreting the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Tenth Circuit's failure to recognize Hilliard's liberty interest in
personal security is further unwarranted when based on the Supreme
Court's decision in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Serv-
ices. 160 The Court in DeShaney specifically left open the possibility that a
liberty interest in personal security exists in circumstances similar to
those in Hilliard, indicating that physical control by the state is not a
condition precedent to the existence of a liberty interest in personal se-
curity. In DeShaney, a section 1983 claim was filed alleging that social
workers and local officials failed to remove four-year-old Joshua
DeShaney from his father's custody when they should have known the
child was being abused. Joshua was beaten so severely that he suffered
massive brain damage and was expected to spend the rest of his life in
an institution. 16 1 Rejecting DeShaney's claim that his Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interest in personal security was violated, the Court
stated: "As a general matter .... a State's failure to protect an individual
154. Id. at 1216.
155. Id. at 1218 (quoting White, 592 F.2d at 388). The court in Wood held that Os-
trander was not entitled to qualified immunity. It found his conduct exceeded "mere neg-
ligence" and his actions violated a "clearly established" law. Id. Applying the standard for
qualified immunity set forth in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982), the Ninth
Circuit concluded the "clearly established law" requirement should not allow section 1983
defendants to escape liability if their actions defy common sense. The court held a "rea-
sonable police officer" would have been aware of the potential danger facing a woman in
Wood's circumstances and therefore denied Ostrander the protection of qualified immu-
nity. Wood, 851 F.2d at 1218.
156. White, 592 F.2d at 387 (Tone, J., concurring).
157. See Wood, 851 F.2d at 1216. The court's holding in Wood also warrants the conclu-
sion that Ostrander was not entitled to qualified immunity. Id. But see Courson v. McMil-
Iian, 939 F.2d 1479 (11 th Cir. 1991) (citing Hilliard for the proposition that a government
official is entitled to qualified immunity since the right to personal security in a non-custo-
dial setting is not clearly established).
158. Hilliard v. City and County of Denver, 930 F.2d 1516, 1521 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 656 (1991).
159. See White, 592 F.2d at 383.
160. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
161. Id. at 193.
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against private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due
Process Clause."' 16 2 It also denied that due process imposed a duty
upon the state to act pursuant to a "special relationship" it created with
the child.16 3 No such relationship existed, the Court concluded, be-
cause the child was not under the "custody" of the state.
16 4
However, DeShaney explicitly left room for finding a liberty interest
in personal security in circumstances where the state does not have
physical control over an individual. The Court found substantive due
process would be violated "when the State by the affirmative exercise of
its power so restrains an individual's liberty that it renders him unable to
care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for.., reasonable
safety."' 6 5 Due process protection from, bodily harm under DeShaney
does not hinge on an element of physical control by the state. 166
Rather, a liberty interest in personal security is violated where the state
fails to provide reasonably safe conditions after it has rendered an indi-
vidual incapable of helping himself or herself.16 7 This was the case in
Hilliard where the Denver Police abandoned Kathy Hilliard after depriv-
ing her of the transportation necessary to leave a high-crime area.
Moreover, the circumstances presented in Hilliard were precisely
those the Court intended to except from the rule that a liberty interest
in personal security exists only if the state has physical control over the
person.' 68 The dissent in DeShaney made reference to White v. Roch-
ford,16 9 indicating that custody need not be considered the only relevant
state action. 170 Consequently, the Supreme Court provided the Tenth
Circuit with a sufficient basis to rule that a liberty interest was violated.
Rejection of this basis again exposes the court's intentions in Hilliard to
limit governmental liability under section 1983. The Tenth Circuit's de-
cision in Hilliard, which acknowledges a person's liberty interest in per-
sonal security only where the state has physical control over the
individual, is very troubling. It seems particularly disingenuous that the
court in Hilliard was, "appalled by the conduct [of the officers],"' 1 yet
not so appalled to find Kathy Hilliard was deprived of her personal
security.
162. Id. at 197.
163. Id. at 199-200.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 200.
166. See Daniel A. Farber, Supreme Court Review: Government Liability After DeShaney,
TRIAL, May 1989, at 18. Farber argued that, after DeShaney, the government may have a
duty to protect individuals when it has helped to make them more vulnerable. Id. He cited
White as an example of circumstances under which the government may be liable. Id. For a
discussion of White, see supra notes 146-51 and accompanying text.
167. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200.
168. Farber, supra note 166.
169. 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979).
170. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 205 (Brennan, J., dissenting).




The court's intention to limit state liability under section 1983 is
evident and the cost to individual liberty is high. The Tenth Circuit's
narrowing of a public employee's liberty interest in his reputation in
Melton ignores William Blackstone's conviction that without one's repu-
tation, "it is impossible to have the perfect enjoyment of any other ad-
vantage or right."'17 2 The court's decision in Hilliard, limiting the
protection of a liberty interest in personal security, jeopardizes whatJus-
tice Oliver Wendell Holmes' identified as the most important element in
any civilized society: "[Slome protection for the person."' 7 3
John M. Spesia
172. Monaghan, supra note 12, at 426 (quoting I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND: OF THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS *134).
173. OLIVER W. HOLMES, Natural Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 310, 312 (1920).
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